



.U.S. Trade Law and Policy Series #10:
Significant Recent Developments in
Section 301 Unfair Trade Cases
Since September 1985, the Administration has instilled new vigor into
its already existing trade policy. A key tool in its recent efforts to insure
that trade affecting U.S. commerce is as free and fair as possible is section
301 of the Trade Act of 1974. Since the fall of 1985, the Administration
has not only taken unprecedented initiatives, but more importantly achieved
significant benefits for domestic industries and the national economic in-
terest. This article reviews recent major developments under this trade
remedy and assesses their significance.
1. Background of Section 301
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended (Trade Act), 1 authorizes
the President to impose duties or other import restrictions and to take any
other "appropriate and feasible action within his power" 2 in response to cer-
tain unfair trade practices. Practices actionable under this authority are any
acts, policies, or practices of a foreign government or its instrumentality that
either: (1) violate or otherwise deny benefits to the United Sates under a trade
*Chairman, Section 301 Committee; Deputy General Counsel, Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative.
tGeneral Counsel to the U.S. Trade Representative.
The views expressed in this article are solely those of the authors.
1. 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1982 & Supp. I11 1985). Sections 301-306 were preceded by § 252
of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 76 Stat. 882 (repealed 1974), and amended by title IX
of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 93 Stat. 144, 295-300, and by § 304 of the Trade and
Tariff Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 2948, 3002-06.
2. 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1982 & Supp. 111 1985).
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agreement, 3 or (2) are unjustifiable, 4 unreasonable 5 or discriminatory,6 and
a burden or restriction 7 on U.S. commerce. 8
3. The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) has interpreted "trade agreement"
to meaneither the General Agreementon TariffsandTrade, Oct. 30, 1947,61 Stat. 5,6,T.I.A.S.
No. 1700, 27 U.N.T.S. 19 [hereinafter GATT], or a trade agreement approved under § 3(a) of
the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 19 U.S.C. § 2503(a) (1982) (i.e., Agreement on Implemen-
tation of Article VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Relating to Customs Val-
uation), Apr. 12, 1979, T.I.A.S. No. 10,402 [hereinafter Customs Valuation Code]; Agreement
on Government Procurement, Apr. 12, 1979, T.I.A.S. No. 10,403; Agreement on Import Li-
censing Procedures, Apr. 12, 1979,32 U.S.T. 1585, T.I.A.S. No. 9788; Agreement on Technical
Barriers to Trade (Relating to Product Standards), Apr. 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 405, T.1.A.S. No.
9616; Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Relating to Subsidies and Countervailing Measures),
Apr. 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 513, T.I.A.S. No. 9619 [hereinafter Subsidies Code]; Agreement on
Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Relating to An-
tidumping Measures), Apr. 12, 1979,31 U.S.T. 4919, T.I.A.S. No. 9650; Agreement on Trade
in Civil Aircraft, Apr. 12, 1979,31 U.S.T. 619, T.I.A.S. No. 9620.
The reason for this limited construction-excluding, for example, treaties offriendship, com-
merce and navigation-is that in any case involving a trade agreement, § 303(a) of the Trade
Act, 19 U.S.C. § 2413(a) (Supp. 111 1985), requires the Trade Representative to "promptly re-
quest proceedings on the matter under the formal dispute settlement procedures provided" in
such agreement. Id. Some non-GATT agreements relating to trade call for dispute settlement
through referral to the International Court ofJustice. See, e.g., art. XVI, § 2 of the Convention
of Establishment between the United States of America and France, Nov. 25, 1959, II U.S.T.
2398, T.I.A.S. No. 4625. In the belief that Congress did not intend to require resort to the World
Court in trade disputes, the Office ofthe U.S. Trade Representative consistently has construed
"trade agreement" narrowly, thus limiting § 303(a)'s requirement to exhaust international dis-
pute settlement procedures.
4. Section 301(e)(4) of the Trade Act, 19 U.S.C. § 241 l(e)(4) (Supp. 111 1985), defines "un-
justifiable" to mean an act, policy, or practice which is in violation of or inconsistent with in-
ternational legal rights of the United States, including denial of: (1) national or most-favored-
nation treatment (treating U.S. firms less favorably than domestic or third country firms, re-
spectively), (2) the right to establish an enterprise in a foreign country, and (3) protection of
intellectual property rights (such as copyrights or trademarks).
5. Section 301(e)(3) of the Trade Act, 19 U.S.C. § 241 l(e)(3) (Supp. I1 1985), defines "un-
reasonable" to mean any act, policy, or practice which, although not inconsistent with inter-
national legal rights of the United States, is otherwise unfair or inequitable, such as denial of
fair and equitable: (1) market opportunities, (2) opportunities to establish an enterprise, and (3)
protection of intellectual property rights.
6. Section 301(e)(5) of the Trade Act, 19 U.S.C. § 241 l(e)(5) (Supp. 111 1985), defines "dis-
criminatory" to include denial of national or most-favored-nation treatment to United States
goods, services, or investment.
7. In most cases where the President has made a determination of unfairness and a finding of
a burden or restriction on U.S. commerce was required, he has found both a burden and a re-
strictionon U.S. commerce. E.g., Memorandum ofMarch 16, 1986, forthe United StatesTrade
Representative, Determination under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 51 Fed. Reg. 9437
(1986) [hereinafter Memorandum of March 16, 1986] (Japan's import quotas on leather and leather
footwear). In at least one case, however, he distinguished between the two and found only a
restriction, not also a burden. Memorandum ofNov. 16, 1984, to the United States Trade Rep-
resentative, Determination under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 49 Fed. Reg. 45,733
(1984) (Argentina's prohibition on carriage of time-sensitive commercial documents from Ar-
gentina by anyone other than the Argentine postal authority).
8. Section 301(c)(l)ofthe Trade Act, 19 U.S.C. § 241 l(e)(l) (Supp. II1 1985), defines "com-
merce" to include services associated with international trade, and foreign direct investment
by United States persons with implications for trade in goods and services.
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Section 301 investigations may be initiated in response to a petition
filed by an interested person 9 or by the U.S. Trade Representative on his
own motion.10 When a petition is filed, the U.S. Trade Representative
must determine whether to initiate an investigation within forty-five days
of its receipt." If the Trade Representative initiates an investigation, he
must request consultations with the foreign government or instrumentality
concerned, either on the date of initiation or within ninety days there-
after. 12 If the investigation concerns exclusively a trade agreement 13 and
a mutually acceptable resolution is not achieved during the consultation
period specified in that agreement, then the Trade Representative must
promptly request proceedings, under the formal dispute settlement pro-
cedures provided in that agreement. 14
The Trade Act establishes deadlines for the section 301 investigation,
depending upon the subject matter. For disputes involving only export
subsidies, the deadline is seven months from initiation; for disputes in-
volving only domestic subsidies or domestic and export subsidies, eight
months from initiation; for disputes involving any trade agreement other
than the Subsidies Code, 15 thirty days after the conclusion of dispute
settlement under the agreement; and for disputes not involving a trade
agreement, twelve months from initiation.16 By the deadline, the Trade
Representative must recommend to the President what action, if any, he
9. Section 302(a)(1) of the Trade Act, 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a)(1) (Supp. 111 1985); 15 C.F.R.
§ 2006.0(b) (1986).
10. While the President previously could initiate investigations on his own motion, the
USTR was not authorized to do so until 1984. See 19 U.S.C. § 2412(c) (Supp. 1II 1985)
(originally enacted as Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, § 304, 98 Stat. 2948, 3002, 3004 (1984));
H.R. REP. No. 1156, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 147 (1984).
11. Section 302(a)(2) of the Trade Act, 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a)(2) (Supp. 111 1985); 15 C.F.R.
§ 2006.3 (1986).
12. Section 303(b)(1)(A) of the Trade Act, 19 U.S.C. § 2413(b)(1)(A) (Supp. I1 1985)
(originally enacted as Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, § 304, 98 Stat. 2948, 3005); see H.R.
REP. No. 1156, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 147 (1984).
13. See supra note 3. When an investigation involves issues that are not covered by a
trade agreement as well as issues that are, in practice the Office of the U.S. Trade Rep-
resentative must decide either to: (1) bifurcate its investigation and pursue trade agreement
dispute settlement on appropriate issues, or (2) consolidate its investigation and therefore
not invoke trade agreement dispute settlement procedures at all. For example, the Brazil
Informatics case (Docket No. 301-49) involved both GATT issues (e.g., quota and tariff
questions) and non-GATT issues (e.g., restrictions on investment, transfer of technology,
and enforcement of intellectual property rights). Brazil Informatics Policy, 50 Fed. Reg.
37,608 (USTR 1985) (initiation). In this case, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative
elected to proceed bilaterally on all issues rather than in part under the GATT. Id. Until
quite recently, most § 301 cases have involved trade agreements.
14. Section 303(a) of the Trade Act, 19 U.S.C. § 2413(a) (Supp. 11 1985); 15 C.F.R.
§ 2006.5(b) (1986).
15. Subsidies Code, supra note 3.
16. Section 304(a)(1) of the Trade Act, 19 U.S.C. § 2414(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. II1 1985).
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should take under section 301 with respect to the matters under investi-
gation. 17 Within twenty-one days of his receipt of that recommendation,
the President must determine what action, if any, he will take and publish
his determination and the reasons for it. 18
Section 301 differs from some other U.S. statutory trade remedies' 9 in
two major ways. First, unlike the antidumping and countervailing duty
laws in particular,20 section 301 gives the U.S. Trade Representative dis-
cretion in deciding whether to initiate an investigation, 2 1 and the President
equal discretion in determining whether to find a practice actionable under
section 30122 and to provide relief (and if so, what kind).23 The only
requirements are that unless the U.S. Trade Representative terminates
an investigation, he must make nonpublic recommendations to the Pres-
ident by an established date, 24 and the President must make a public
determination. 25
Second, section 301 is extraordinary among U.S. trade remedies in that
it has been used principally to seek more open access to a foreign market. 26
17. Id.
18. Section 301(c)(2) of the Trade Act, 19 U.S.C. § 241 l(c)(2) (Supp. 1I1 1985).
19. E.g., Trade Act §§ 201-203, as amended, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2243 (Supp. 111 1985);
Tariff Act of 1930, § 337, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (Supp. I11 1985).
20. Section 303 and title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (Tariff Act), 19 U.S.C.
§§ 1303, 1671-1677g (1982 & Supp. 1II 1985).
21. By contrast, the Department of Commerce must initiate an antidumping or counter-
vailing duty investigation if an interested party files a petition on behalf of a U.S. industry
and alleges injurious sales at less than fair value or subsidization and provides some infor-
mation reasonably available to it in support of those allegations. Sections 702(b)(1), 732(b)(1)
of the Tariff Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671a(b)(l), 1673a(b)(l) (1982).
22. The President has wide discretion in determining what practices are inconsistent with
a trade agreement or otherwise unjustifiable, unreasonable, or discriminatory and a burden
or restriction on U.S. commerce. By contrast, the Department of Commerce has significantly
less discretion in determining what constitutes a subsidy (see § 771(5) of the Tariff Act, 19
U.S.C. § 1677(5) (1982)), or how to calculate foreign market value (see § 773 of the Tariff
Act, 19 U.S.C. § 1677b (1982 & Supp. 111 1985)).
23. Under § 301, the President may decide to provide no relief even if a practice is
actionable; and can provide relief where warranted through tariff or other import restrictions,
agreement with the foreign government concerned, or any other "appropriate and feasible
action" within his power. By contrast, if the Department of Commerce finds sales at less
than fair value or subsidies and (where required) the International Trade Commission finds
consequent injury to U.S. industry, the Department of Commerce must issue an order
imposing offsetting duties. Sections 706 and 736 of the Tariff Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671e, 1673e
(1982 & Supp. I1 1985).
24. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
25. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
26. Section 307 of the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 2948, 3012, authorizes the
Trade Representative to impose duties or other import restrictions in response to a foreign
country's export performance requirements that adversely affect the economic interests of
the United States. Section 307 could be used to facilitate better access to foreign markets
for U.S. investment, as well as to protect the U.S. market against increased imports as a
result of foreign export performance requirements.
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Other trade remedies 27 respond to effects of foreign practices within the
U.S., such as the importation of merchandise that has been subsidized
and that causes or threatens injury to a U.S. industry, 28 or whose im-
portation has increased so as to be a substantial cause of serious injury
to a U.S. industry. 29 Therefore, if a U.S. firm faces unfair trade barriers
in a foreign market by reason of governmental action, section 301 is the
main U.S. trade remedy he can try to use to seek expanded access to
that market for his exports of goods or services or his investment. 30
II. Recent Developments under Section 301
From the enactment of section 301 in 1974 until September 1985, only
forty-eight investigations were initiated, all in response to petitions filed
by interested persons. 31 By comparison, well over five hundred anti-
dumping and countervailing duty petitions have been filed just since 1980.32
Most of the section 301 investigations from 1974-1985 involved trade
agreements (usually GATT), 33 and dispute settlement procedures under
such agreements in some cases continued for years. 34 Although GATT
27. See supra notes 19-20.
28. Sections 303 and 701-06 of the Tariff Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1303, 1671-1671e (1982 &
Supp. III 1985).
29. Sections 201-03 of the Trade Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2251-53 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
30. Successive amendments to § 301 have clarified or extended its application to services
and investment as well as goods. See § 901 of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 93 Stat.
144, 296, defining "commerce" to include services associated with international trade; and
§ 304 of the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 2948, 3005, defining "commerce" to
include not only services, but also foreign direct investment by United States persons with
implications for trade in goods and services.
31. Section 301 Table of Cases, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (Aug. 1986)
[hereinafter Section 301 Table].
32. Testimony of Malcolm Baldrige, Secretary of Commerce, on Illegal and Unfair Foreign
Trade Practices in Interstate and Foreign Commerce at 18, before the House Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations (Sept. 9, 1986).
33. E.g., GATT cases have included a 1975 complaint by the National Canners Association
about the European Community's (EC's) import price system with respect to canned fruits,
juices and vegetables (which the EC discontinued following the GATT panel report favorable
to the U.S.; see European Communities, 44 Fed. Reg. 1504 (USTR 1979) (termination)); a
1976 complaint by the National Soybean Processors Association and the American Soybean
Association about the EC's requirement that livestock feed be mixed with domestic nonfat
milk (which the EC terminated while the GATT dispute settlement was pending; see Eu-
ropean Communities, 44 Fed. Reg. 1504 (USTR 1979) (termination)); and a 1977 complaint
by George F. Fisher, Inc. that Japan had concluded agreements with Brazil, Korea, and
The People's Republic of China discriminatorily permitting thrown silk imports from those
countries, displacing U.S. exports to Japan (Japan adjusted the restrictions before the GATT
panel issued its report; see Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiation, 43
Fed. Reg. 8876 (USTR 1978) (termination)).
34. For example, the U.S. initiated dispute settlement proceedings under the Subsidies
Code in 1981, complaining of the EC's use of export subsidies to gain more than an equitable
share of world export trade in wheat flour. See Subsidies Code, supra note 3. Although the
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dispute settlement procedures have proved satisfactory in most cases,
their failures-especially in controversial agricultural cases-have been
conspicuous 35 and have undermined confidence in the GATT.
The Administration's approach in 1985 to this unsatisfactory state of
affairs was twofold. First, it decided to make the improvement of inter-
national dispute settlement procedures a high priority in the new round
of multilateral trade negotiations. 36 The improvement and extension of
substantive rules could enhance the international trading system only if
the parties subscribing to them could rely on an effective mechanism for
resolving disputes about their application. 37
Second, the Administration renewed its commitment to a vigorous sec-
tion 301 program. The President focused expressly on this trade remedy
in a radio address on September 7, 1985.38 By stressing the need for
improved access for U.S. firms to foreign markets, he indirectly focused
on section 301 in a major trade speech delivered September 23. 39 Thus
the President not only set the stage, but specifically called for more ef-
fective use of this market-opening trade remedy.
A. PRESIDENTIAL ACTION WITHOUT FORMAL INVESTIGATION
Prior to 1986, any Presidential action under section 301 had always been
preceded by a formal investigation by the Office of the U.S. Trade Rep-
resentative (USTR) under section 302 of the Trade Act. 40 In 1986, the
President for the first time acted on his own motion without a preceding
formal USTR investigation.
1. EC Enlargement
Effective January 1, 1986, Portugal and Spain joined the European
Communities (EQ.41 As part of the arrangements for Portugal's and
panel issued a report in 1983, it declined to rule on the fundamental legal question involved,
and the GATT Council has not acted on the report. Section 301 Table, supra note 31.
35. See generally Review of the Effectiveness of Trade Dispute Settlement Under the
GATT and the Tokyo Round Agreements, Inv. No. 332-12, USITC Pub. 1793 (Dec. 1985).
36. Testimony of Ambassador Clayton Yeutter, U.S. Trade Representative, on U.S. Trade
Policy and Unfair Trade Practices at 12, Before the Senate Finance Comm., 99th Cong.,
1st Sess. (Nov. 14, 1985).
37. Id.
38. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Radio Address of the President to
the Nation, 21 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1047 (Sept. 7, 1985).
39. Remarks by the President to Business Leaders and Members of the President's Export
Council and Advisory Committee for Trade Negotiations, 21 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.
1128 (Sept. 23, 1985).
40. 19 U.S.C. § 2412 (Supp. I11 1985).
41. Treaty signed on the 12th of June, 1985, between the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom
of Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, the French Republic,
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Spain's accession, effective March 1, 1986, the EC: (1) imposed restric-
tions on the importation into Portugal of oilseeds and oilseed products
and on the consumption of certain vegetable oils in Portugal; (2) required
that a specified portion of Portuguese imports of grains be reserved for
suppliers from other member countries of the EC; and (3) withdrew Span-
ish tariff concessions and imposed variable levies on imports of corn and
sorghum. The average annual value of U.S. exports affected by the EC
actions exceeded a billion dollars in the 1981-1983 period. 42
In discussions with the EC, the U.S. sought the removal of the restric-
tions in Portugal, which it considered to be inconsistent with the GATT.43
In accordance with its rights under GATT, it also sought appropriate
compensation from the EC for the tariff and variable levy actions in
Spain. 44
On March 31, 1986, the President announced that he would impose
restrictions on imports of EC products of comparable effect to the EC's
restrictions in Portugal unless and until the U.S. were able to resolve
these matters. 45 He also announced that, in response to the EC's tariff
and levy actions in Spain, he would withdraw U.S. tariff commitments
in GATT on certain products, but would maintain 'the current level of
tariffs in order to allow until July 1 for expedited negotiation of agreed
compensation from the EC. He said he would proclaim increased duties
as appropriate if such agreement were not possible, and restore conces-
sions to the degree those negotiations were successful. 46
USTR held a public hearing on proposed U.S. action on April 21-
22. 47 On May 15, the President formally determined, under section 301,
that the quantitative restrictions on oilseeds, oilseed products, and grains
in Portugal and the uncompensated withdrawal of tariff concessions on
corn and sorghum in Spain denied benefits to the United States arising
under GATT. He further determined that they were unreasonable, and
Ireland, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Neth-
erlands, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (Member States of the
European Communities), and the Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic concerning
the Accession of the Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic to the European
Economic Community and to the European Atomic Energy Community, O.J. EUR. COMM.
(No. L 302) (Nov. 15, 1985).
42. Memorandum of May 15, 1986, for the United States Trade Representative, Deter-
mination Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 51 Fed. Reg. 18,294 (1986) [hereinafter
Memorandum of May 15, 1986].
43. Under art. XXIV of GATT, supra note 3, the EC may enlarge its membership, but
cannot impose quotas in connection with such enlargement.
44. Memorandum of May 15, 1986, supra note 42.
45. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the Principal Deputy
Press Secretary and Fact Sheet, 22 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 435 (March 31, 1986).
46. Id.
47. 51 Fed. Reg. 11,532 (1986).
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constituted a burden and restriction on U.S. commerce. 48 In response
to the EC's quantitative restrictions in Portugal, he proclaimed certain
quantitative restrictions on products of the EC (chocolate candy, apple
juice, certain beer, and white wine). 49 These quotas were adjustable to
mirror the effects of the EC measures on U.S. exports to Portugal. 50
In response to the EC's withdrawal of tariff concessions on corn and
sorghum in Spain, he suspended U.S. tariff concessions on certain
products. 51 U.S. tariffs, however, were not increased, pending efforts
to resolve U.S. claims.52
On July 2, the United States and the EC reached an interim solution
of the dispute regarding corn and sorghum exports to Spain. 53 The EC
undertook to assure that any loss of U.S. exports of corn and sorghum
to Spain compared to a monthly average of 234,000 metric tons for the
remaining six months of 1986 would be offset by increased access to the
EC under a reduced import levy quota. The United States will not increase
duties on EC products while U.S. exports are safeguarded in this way.
The two parties also made a commitment to reach definitive settlement
of the issues by December 31, 1986. 54
2. Taiwan Customs Valuation
The President made a second determination under section 301 in 1986
without a preceding formal investigation under section 302 by USTR.
On August 1, he determined that Taiwan's use of a duty paying list
system to determine the value of imports for purposes of calculating
customs duties violated a trade agreement and was unjustifiable or
unreasonable and a burden or restriction on United States commerce. 55
He determined to take appropriate and feasible action against Taiwan,
and directed the Trade Representative to recommend specific retaliatory
measures .56
48. Memorandum of May 15, 1986, supra note 42.
49. Proclamation No. 5478 at 1, para. 3 and annex 1, 51 Fed. Reg. 18,296 (1986).
50. Report to Congress Required by Section 306 of the Trade Act of 1974 (January-June
1986) at I [hereinafter Section 306 Report].
51. Proclamation No. 5478 at 1, para. 4, at 2, para. 2, 51 Fed. Reg. 18,296 (1986).
52. Id.
53. Section 306 Report, supra note 50, at 1; see also Finan. Times, July 3, 1986, at I,
col. 3; Testimony of Ambassador Clayton Yeutter on Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974,
at 4, 9, Before the Senate Finance Comm., 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (July 22, 1986) [hereinafter
Yeutter Testimony].
54. Section 306 Report, supra note 50, at I.
55. Memorandum of Aug. I, 1986, for the United States Trade Representative, Deter-
mination Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 51 Fed. Reg. 28,219 (1986) [hereinafter
Memorandum of Aug. 1, 1986].
56. Id.
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The background of this dispute is an agreement by Taiwan in 1979 to
observe obligations "substantially equivalent" to those applied to devel-
oping countries under the GATT Customs Valuation Code. 57 A key ob-
ligation under that Code is to value imports for purposes of calculating
customs duties based on their "transaction value" 58 (usually the invoice
price). While developed countries that became parties to the Code un-
dertook this obligation immediately after its entry into force for them,
developing countries were not required to implement this and other ob-
ligations for five years after the Code's entry into force for them. 59 Taiwan
should therefore have used "transaction value" for customs purposes
effective January 1, 1986.60
However, in 1986 Taiwan enacted a law establishing a duty paying list
system for valuing imports for customs purposes. This system was based
upon administratively determined values rather than "transaction value"-
a breach of its 1979 commitment.
Following the President's August I determination, 6 1 the Taiwan au-
thorities agreed to issue regulations by September I that would abolish
the duty paying list system by October 1. Based upon this satisfactory
resolution of this trade conflict, no retaliatory action against Taiwan was
taken. 62
B. SELF-INITIATED SECTION 301 INVESTIGATIONS
Another historical first was the President's direction to the Trade Rep-
resentative to initiate investigations under section 302 on his own mo-
tion. 63 On September 16, 1985, the Trade Representative "self-initiated"
57. See supra note 3. Taiwan could not be a party to the Code itself since it is not a GATT
party. The United States derecognized Taiwan in 1978 (Memorandum of Dec. 30, 1978,
Relations With the People of Taiwan, 3 C.F.R. § 318 (1979)), but still conducts relations
with Taiwan. See generally the Taiwan Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 96-8, 93 Stat. 14 (1979).
The 1979 agreement on customs valuation is one of several trade agreements with Taiwan.
58. Customs Valuation Code, supra note 3, art. 1.
59. Id., arts. 24 and 21, respectively. The opportunity for developing countries only to
delay implementation of obligations under the Code was a "special and differential" measure
for developing countries.
60. That is, five years from the Code's entry into force on January 1, 1981. Id. arts. 21
and 24.
61. Memorandum of Aug. I, 1986, supra note 55.
62. Taiwan Customs Valuation, 51 Fed. Reg. 37,528 (1986). See also Finan. Times, Oct. 3,
1986, at 5, col. 2.
63. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Radio Address of the President to
the Nation (Sept. 7, 1985).
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three investigations, 64  and-also at the President's request65-- on
November 4, 1985, he self-initiated a fourth. 66
1. Korea Insurance
One self-initiated investigation was directed at U.S. insurance firms'
lack of fair and equitable access to the Korean insurance market, 67 already
the object of an earlier section 301 case.68 The Korean Government was
prohibiting or restricting operations of foreign insurance firms in the five
billion dollar Korean compulsory fire insurance, life insurance and rein-
surance markets. The United States considered these restrictions incon-
sistent with the U.S.-Korea Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and
Navigation. 69
USTR requested and received written comments from representatives
of the U.S. insurance industry, the Life Insurance Association of Korea,
and the Korea Non-life Insurance Association. The U.S. and Korean
Governments conducted a series of consultations and negotiations re-
garding modification of Korean practices. 70
On July 21, the White House announced that the two governments had
reached an agreement ad referendum that would significantly increase
64. Brazil's Informatics Policy, 50 Fed. Reg. 37,608 (USTR 1985) (initiation); Korea's
Restrictions on Insurance Services, 50 Fed. Reg. 37,609 (USTR 1985) (initiation); Japan's
Practice With Respect to the Manufacture, Importation and Sale of Tobacco Products, 50
Fed. Reg. 37,609 (USTR 1985) (initiation).
65. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the Principal Deputy
Press Secretary, 21 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1258 (Oct. 16, 1985).
66. Adequacy of Korean Laws for the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights, 50 Fed.
Reg. 45,883 (1985).
67. Korea's Restrictions on Insurance Services, 50 Fed. Reg. 37,609 (USTR 1985) (initiation).
68. See American Home Assurance Co., 44 Fed. Reg. 75,246 (1979) (initiation). Petitioner
alleged that the Government of the Republic of Korea (Korea) discriminated against it by:
(I) failing to issue a license permitting petitioner to write insurance policies covering marine
risks, (2) not permitting petitioner to participate in joint venture fire insurance; and (3) failing
to grant retrocessions from Korea Reinsurance Corp. to petitioner on the same basis as
Korean insurance firms. Id. (initiation).
On Nov. 26, 1980, the Office of the United States Trade Representative invited public
comments on proposals for retaliation. American Home Assurance Co., 45 Fed. Reg. 78,850
(1980). As a result of consultations, the Korean Government agreed to promote more open
competition in its insurance market. On Dec. 19, 1980, petitioner withdrew its petition, and
on Dec. 29, USTR terminated its investigation. American Home Assurance Co., 45 Fed.
Reg. 85,539 (1980) (termination).
69. Nov. 28, 1956, United States-Korea, 8 U.S.T. 2217, T.I.A.S. No. 3947. Article VII of
this treaty provides in part:
Nationals and companies of either Party shall be accorded national treatment with
respect to engaging in all types of commercial, industrial, financial and other activities
for gain (business activities) within the territories of the other Party, whether directly or
by agent or through the medium of any form of lawful juridical entity.
Id.
70. The two governments consulted in November and December 1985 and February,
March, and July 1986. See Section 301 Table, supra note 31.
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U.S firms' access to the Korean market by enabling them to underwrite
both life and non-life insurance in Korea.7' Korea agreed to license qual-
ified U.S. insurance firms to participate fully in its market, and to provide
all necessary information on applicable technical requirements. On
August 14, 1986, the President determined, under section 301, to accept
this agreement as an appropriate and feasible action to terminate the
investigation under section 302, and therefore he terminated the investi-
gation. He also directed the Trade Representative to "take any actions
necessary to implement and monitor [the agreement]." 72
2. Korea Intellectual Property
Another self-initiated investigation was of Korea's inadequate protec-
tion of intellectual property rights. 73 An important component of the
President's Trade Policy Action Plan, formulated in September 1985, was
further protection of patents, copyrights, trademarks, and other intellec-
tual property rights. 74
To this end, on October 16, 1985, the President directed the Trade
Representative to self-initiate an investigation into the adequacy of the
laws of the Republic of Korea governing the protection of intellectual
property rights and the effect of these laws on U.S. trade.75 In the notice
self-initiating an investigation on November 4, 1985, USTR stated that
Korea's laws appear to deny effective protection to U.S. intellectual prop-
erty, such as the lack of patent protection for certain types of products,
limitation of protection to process patents in some cases, and the lack of
copyright protection. 76
USTR asked interested parties to submit written comments regarding
the appropriate scope of the investigation, support or opposition to the
investigation, and detailed information regarding specific problems cre-
ated by Korean laws and their effect on trade. U.S. industries commented
extensively regarding specific problems with intellectual property protec-
tion and enforcement of existing laws, including copyright protection for
computer software and audio recordings, effective enforcement of copy-
71. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the Deputy Press
Secretary I, 22 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 970 (July 21, 1986).
72. Memorandum of Aug. 14, 1986, for the United States Trade Representative, Deter-
mination Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 51 Fed. Reg. 29,443 (1986).
73. Korea's Restrictions on Insurance Services, 50 Fed. Reg. 37,609 (USTR 1985) (initiation).
74. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, The President's Trade Policy Action
Plan 4 (Sept. 23, 1985); see also Administration Statement on the Protection of U.S. Intel-
lectual Property Rights Abroad (USTR April 7, 1986).
75. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the Principal Deputy
Press Secretary, 21 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1258 (Oct. 16, 1985).
76. Adequacy of Korean Laws for the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights, 50 Fed.
Reg. 45,883 (1985).
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right laws pertaining to literary works, and patent protection for phar-
maceutical and agricultural chemical products. 77
On November 29, 1985, the U.S. and Korean Governments began a
series of consultations and negotiations in both Korea and Washington.
These consultations continued in December 1985 and from February
through July 1986.78
On July 21, 1986, the White House announced the conclusion of an
agreement with the Korean Government that will dramatically improve
protection of intellectual property rights in Korea.79 Concerning copy-
rights, the Korean Government agreed to present to its National Assembly
for enactment by mid-1987 comprehensive copyright bills including cov-
erage of traditional literary works, sound recordings, and computer soft-
ware. Although there will be a separate bill for computer software copy-
right protection, its provisions will be consistent with those of the general
copyright law, and an interministerial committee will be established to
ensure that the administration of these laws conforms. The new copyright
law will provide a term of life plus fifty years for works whose authors
are individuals, and of fifty years from first publication in the country of
origin for works authored by juridical entities, such as corporations. The
Korean Government will accede to the Universal Copyright Convention 80
and Geneva Phonograms Convention 8 ' during 1987. Protection for sound
recordings will be afforded for a twenty-year term as a neighboring right
in the new copyright law, and their protection against unauthorized re-
production, importation, and distribution will be strengthened through
stricter enforcement of Korea's Phonograms Law. The Korean Govern-
ment will study the feasibility of extending copyright protection to data
bases as compilations, semiconductor chips, satellite telecasts, and cable
TV. It will also strengthen penalties against copyright infringement under
the new copyright law so that the rights of both domestic and foreign
copyright owners can be protected effectively. 82
Concerning patent rights, the Korean Government will introduce for
enactment by mid-1987 a comprehensive bill to amend the patent law to
include patent coverage for chemical and pharmaceutical products and
new uses of chemical and pharmaceutical products. It will establish a
patent term of fifteen years from the date of publication of the patent
application, and provide for the granting of nonexclusive licenses only in
77. Section 306 Report, supra note 50, at 6-7.
78. Section 301 Table, supra note 31.
79. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the Deputy Press
Secretary at 1-2 (July 21, 1986).
80. Oct. 29, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, T.I.A.S. No. 7868.
81. Oct. 29, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 309, T.I.A.S. No. 7808.
82. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet 1-2 (July 21, 1986).
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those situations in which the dependent patent represents a substantial
technical advance over the dominant patent. Patent protection for new
microorganisms will be effective in mid-1987, and Korea will accede to
the Budapest Treaty in 1987.83
On trademarks, Korea eliminated its previous requirement for tech-
nology inducement as a condition for accepting applications for trademark
licenses. As a result, the trademark license will be permitted to continue
beyond the life of any accompanying technology inducement agreement.
Joint venture or raw material supply agreements also will no longer be
necessary for trademark licensing, and Korea repealed export require-
ments on goods covered by trademark licenses, and lifted restrictions on
royalty terms in licenses. Korea also agreed that under its Office of Patent
Administration guidelines, import bans or restrictions will constitute "just
cause" for nonuse, thereby precluding cancellation for nonuse or rejection
of a trademark registration of goods subject to such restrictions. Finally,
Korea agreed to adopt and implement guidelines prohibiting domestic
entities from registering trademarks identical to or resembling those owned
by foreign entities, regardless whether the foreign mark is "well known"
in Korea. 84
The Korean Government also agreed to ensure adequate protection of
intellectual property rights. It agreed to give a high priority to enforcement
and to enact effective penalties for intellectual property rights violations. 85
On August 14, 1986, the President determined, under section 301, to
approve this agreement. He terminated the investigation under section
302 and directed the Trade Representative to "take any actions necessary
to implement and monitor [the agreement]. ' 86
3. Japan Manufactured Tobacco Products
A third self-initiated investigation was of Japan's practices with respect
to the manufacture, importation, and sale of manufactured tobacco prod-
ucts. At the President's direction on September 7, 1985,87 on September 16
the Trade Representative initiated an investigation on his own motion of
Japan's practices with respect to the manufacture, importation, and sale
of tobacco products. 88 The initiation notice mentioned Japan's barriers
to imports of foreign tobacco products, including high tariffs; discrimi-
83. Id. at 2.
84. Id. at 2-3.
85. Id. at 3.
86. Memorandum of Aug. 14, 1986, for the United States Trade Representative, Deter-
mination Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 51 Fed. Reg. 29,445 (1986).
87. See supra note 63.
88. Japan's Practice With Respect to the Manufacture, Importation and Sale of Tobacco
Products, 50 Fed. Reg. 37,609 (USTR 1985) (initiation).
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natory rules on marketing, advertising, and distribution; and maintenance
of a government monopoly on the importation and sale of tobacco prod-
ucts. These barriers were said to have resulted in higher prices for im-
ported products than for domestically made products. The notice stated
that while the Japanese Government had taken steps to liberalize and
modify these practices, some barriers continued.8 9
On October 6, 1986, the White House Office of the Press Secretary
announced the conclusion of an agreement with Japan on October 3 re-
solving this case.90 Under the agreement, the Government of Japan will
suspend its tariff on imported manufactured tobacco products, reducing
it to zero. It also will end the discriminatory deferral of excise tax pay-
ments by its tobacco monopoly by April 1, 1987, and modify its price
approval system to shorten the application period significantly and to
make the process transparent and virtually automatic. In addition, the
agreement notes that the government-controlled distribution instrumen-
tality had satisfactorily addressed the major existing distribution problems.
On October 6, the President determined that when implemented, the
agreement should accomplish the goal of obtaining increased access for
U.S. firms to Japan's cigarette market. Therefore, under section 301 he
determined that the agreement is an appropriate and feasible response to
Japan's policies and practices regarding tobacco products, which he ex-
pressly found to be unfair ("looked at as a whole") and a burden or
restriction on U.S. commerce. He directed that the section 301 proceeding
be suspended until the agreement is fully implemented. 91
4. Brazil Informatics
Also at the President's direction, 92 on September 16 the Trade Rep-
resentative initiated on his own motion an investigation of the Government
of Brazil's informatics policy. 93 The initiation notice cited Brazil's codi-
fication in 1984 of a preexisting policy designed to promote a national
informatics (computer and computer-related) industry. It reported that
the informatics law imposes a wide array of restrictions on foreign par-
ticipation in the informatics sector, provides certain incentives for national
firms, and restricts foreign direct investment through the imposition of
89. id.
90. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Memorandum for the United States
Trade Representative, Determination Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 22 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 1340 (Oct. 6, 1986).
91. Memorandum of Oct. 6, 1986, for the United States Trade Representative, Deter-
mination Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 51 Fed. Reg. 35,995 (1986) [hereinafter
Memorandum of Oct. 6, 1986].
92. See supra note 63.
93. Brazil's Informatics Policy, 50 Fed. Reg. 37,608 (1985).
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local content and export performance requirements. The Trade Repre-
sentative noted that while this policy was in effect, U.S. firms in Brazil
were denied approval to manufacture new product lines and found it
increasingly difficult to import needed inputs. Moreover, U.S exports to
Brazil grew at less than half the rate of Brazilian market growth from
1980-82, a period of rapid market expansion in Brazil. 94
On October 6, 1986, the President determined under section 301 that
the Brazilian informatics acts, policies, and practices are unreasonable
and a burden or restriction on U.S. commerce. 95 In addition to the prac-
tices described in the initiation notice, 96 the President referenced Brazil's
failure to provide full copyright protection to computer software, resulting
in heavy losses to U.S. firms from software piracy; and use of its authority
to regulate foreign investment to force out U.S. informatics firms with
operations in Brazil. 97
The President directed the Trade Representative to continue negotia-
tions with Brazil to address the U.S. concerns and to monitor commit-
ments already made by the Government of Brazil. While he deferred a
final decision until December 31, 1986, the President directed the Trade
Representative to notify the GATT of the United States intention under
GATT article XVIII, paragraph 21,98 to suspend the application of U.S.
tariff concessions to imports from Brazil to compensate for the annual
loss in U.S. sales opportunities in Brazil because of the informatics policy.
Finally, the President instructed the Trade Representative to implement
such suspension when appropriate. 99
C. RETALIATORY MEASURES AS A CATALYST FOR RESOLUTION
A high priority on the President's section 301 agenda was the resolution
of some particularly difficult, long pending disputes. One of these was an
ongoing dispute with the EC about discriminatory tariff preferences for
certain Mediterranean countries.
This dispute began in 1976 when the Florida Citrus Commission and
otherscomplained about the EC's discriminatory citrus tariff preferences
for certain Mediterranean countries, which adversely affect U.S. citrus
exports to the EC.'00 Although the United States finally obtained a fa-
94. Id.
95. Memorandum of Oct. 6, 1986, supra note 91.
96. Supra note 93.
97. Memorandum of Oct. 6, 1986, supra note 91.
98. T.I.A.S. No. 1700.
99. Memorandum of Oct. 6, 1986, supra note 91.
100. The Special Trade Representative initiated an investigation on Nov. 30, 1976 (41 Fed.
Reg. 52,567 (1976)), and held public hearings on Jan. 25, 1977. During the Tokyo Round of
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vorable GATT panel report in 1984, the EC blocked its adoption by the
Council. 101 The United States thereafter deemed dispute settlement con-
cluded. 102 On June 20, 1985, the President found the discriminatory EC
tariffs actionable under section 301, on the grounds that they deny the
U.S. benefits under the GATT, are unreasonable and discriminatory, and
constitute a burden and restriction on U.S. commerce. 103 On June 21 he
proclaimed duties to become effective July 6, 1985, of forty percent ad
valorem on U.S. imports of pasta from the EC not containing egg, and
twenty-five percent ad valorem on U.S. imports of pasta from the EC
containing egg. 104 The EC counterretaliated on June 23 by raising its
duties on U.S exports to the EC of lemons and walnuts, also to become
effective July 6.105
On July 19, both sides agreed to delay their duty increases pending the
outcome of bilateral efforts to resolve the underlying dispute by
October 31.106 Because a satisfactory settlement was not reached, on
November 1, the U.S. put into effect its pasta duties and the EC in turn
took action with respect to U.S lemons and walnuts on November 4.107
While a solution then remained beyond the reach of the parties, the U.S.
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, the U.S. obtained duty reductions on fresh grapefruit only.
In October 1980 the U.S. consulted with the EC under GATT art. XXII:1, and later had
informal discussions. The U.S. consulted under GATT art. XXIII:I on April 20, 1982.
Conciliation efforts in September 1982 failed.
On Nov. 2, 1982, the GATT Council agreed to establish a panel. The parties took some
months to agree on the panel's composition and terms of reference. The panel finally met
on Oct. 31 and Nov. 29, 1983, and Feb. 13 and March 12, 1984. The panel submitted the
factual portion of its report to the parties on Sept. 27, and the full report on Dec. 14, 1984.
Section 301 Table, supra note 31.
101. The GATT Council considered the panel's findings and recommendations on March 12
and April 30, 1985, but the EC blocked any action at either session. Id.
102. On May 10 USTR held a public hearing on the substance of the Trade Representative's
recommendations to the President. 50 Fed. Reg. 15,266 (1985). On May 30 the Trade Rep-
resentative transmitted his recommendation to the President. Id.
103. Memorandum of June 20, 1985, for the United States Trade Representative, Deter-
mination Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 50 Fed. Reg. 25,685 (1985). See also
Office of the United States Trade Representative, Ambassador Michael B. Smith Announces
Decision on the Citrus 301 Petition (June 20, 1985).
104. Proclamation No. 5354, 50 Fed. Reg. 26,143 (1985).
105. Section 301 Table, supra note 31; see also Office of the United States Trade Rep-
resentative, Statement by Acting United States Trade Representative Ambassador Michael B.
Smith (June 27, 1985), characterizing the EC's retaliation measures as "totally uncalled
for."
106. Office of the United States Trade Representative, Yeutter Announces Agreement on
Citrus and Pasta (July 19, 1985). Under Proclamation No. 5363, 50 Fed. Reg. 33,711 (1985),
the President suspended the application of increased duties until Nov. 1, 1985, and authorized
the Trade Representative to suspend, modify or terminate the increased duties upon pub-
lication in the Federal Register of his determination that such action is justified by EC actions
toward a mutually acceptable solution of the dispute.
107. Proclamation No. 5363, 50 Fed. Reg. 33,711 (1985).
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actions signaled its unwillingness to tolerate continued adverse effects on
its exports while a trading partner blocked resolution through dispute
settlement.
After months of negotiations, the U.S. and EC reached agreement on
a package of trade concessions on August 10. The EC agreed to lower its
tariffs on various citrus products. In addition to this resolution of the
citrus case, the EC agreed to lower its tariffs on nuts (mainly almonds),
in return for which the U.S. agreed to lower its tariffs on anchovies,
olives, olive oil, capers, paprika, and fermented cider' 0 8 and to increase
its cheese quotas for the EC. Both sides agreed to eliminate the increased
duties imposed in November 1985.109
D. EXPEDITED RESOLUTION OF OLD DISPUTES
1. Japan Leather and Leather Footwear
The Administration also acted to resolve long pending disputes with
Japan over its quotas on imports of leather and leather footwear. On
September 7, 1985, the President directed the Trade Representative to
recommend retaliatory measures unless these disputes were satisfactorily
resolved by December 1, 1985.110
These disputes date back to 1949, when Japan imposed quotas on im-
ports of leather and leather footwear despite the general prohibition of
quotas under article XI of the GATT. I I I In 1977, the Tanners' Council of
America filed a petition complaining about the quotas and allegedly ex-
cessively high tariffs on leather imports. The Special Trade Representative
initiated an investigation. 1 2 After years of consultations,"13 the two gov-
ernments finally reached an understanding that Japan would expand the
leather quota so as not to affect adversely U.S. leather exports to Japan.
On this basis, the President decided not to take retaliatory action, but
108. These tariff reductions are subject to congressional enactment.
109. Withdrawal of Increased Rates of Duty on Certain Pasta Articles from the European
Economic Community, 51 Fed. Reg. 30,146 (1986). See generally Wash. Post, Aug 11, 1986,
at Al, col. 5; N.Y. Times, Aug. 11, 1986, at DI, col. 4.
110. Supra note 38.
111. Article XI: I of GATT, supra note 3, provides in part: "No prohibitions or restrictions
other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made effective through quotas, import
or export licenses or other measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting
party on the importation of any product of the territory of any other contracting party ... "
112. Tanner's Council of America, Inc., 42 Fed. Reg. 42,413 (1977) (initiation). The Special
Representative for Trade Negotiations was redesignated the United States Trade Repre-
sentative by § l(b)(I) of Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1979, 44 Fed. Reg. 69,273 (1979), reprinted
in 5 U.S.C. app. § 1, at 150 (1982), submitted to Congress pursuant to § 1109 of the Trade
Agreements Act of 1979, 93 Stat. 144, 314.
113. The two governments consulted under GATT art. XXIII: I in January 1979. Section
301 Table, supra note 31.
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instead directed the Special Trade Representative to monitor implemen-
tation of the understanding. 114
However, the results of this understanding were unsatisfactory. There-
fore, the United States pursued dispute settlement in the GATT.' 1 5 In
February 1984, a GATT panel found that Japan's leather quotas violated
article XI and caused nullification and impairment of U.S. benefits under
the GATT. The GATT' Council adopted the panel report on May 16, 1984.116
On September 23, 1985, the Government of Japan notified the GATT
Secretariat of its intention to enter into negotiations under article XXVIII:5
to modify or withdraw concessions on leather and leather footwear. It
proposed to replace the quota by tariff rate quotas." 7
While the leather quota dispute continued, the Footwear Industries
Association of America, Inc. and others filed a section 301 petition on
October 25, 1982, alleging that import restrictions on nonrubber footwear
by the Japanese and other governments denied U.S. footwear exporters
access to those markets, were inconsistent with the GATT, and were
unreasonable and/or discriminatory and a burden on U.S. commerce.' 18
After the Trade Representative initiated an investigation, 119 under GATT
article XXIII:2, the United States requested application of the conclusions
reached in 1984 by a GATT panel with respect to the Japanese leather
quotas. 120 On September 23, 1985, the Government of Japan notified the
GATT Secretariat of its intention to enter into negotiations under article
XXVIII:5 to modify or withdraw concessions on leather and leather foot-
wear imports. 121
Following the President's September 7th announcement seeking the
Trade Representative's recommendation of retaliatory measures by De-
cember, 122 the United States and Japan entered into negotiations. In De-
cember the United States accepted compensation from Japan-through
114. Memorandum of July 31, 1980, for the United States Trade Representative, Deter-
mination Under Section 301.of the Trade Act of 1974, 45 Fed. Reg. 51,171 (1980).
115. The U.S. and Japan consulted under GATT art, XXIII:I on Jan. 27-28, March 30,
and April 12, 1983. On April 20 a dispute settlement panel was authorized under GATT art.
XXIII:2. The panel heard the case in the fall and winter of 1983-84. Section 301 Table, supra
note 3 1.
116. Section 301 Table, supra note 31.
117. Memorandum of March 16, 1986, supra note 7.
118. The other countries about whose acts, policies, or practices petitioners complained
were Brazil, the EC, France, Italy, Korea, Spain, Taiwan, and the United Kingdom. See
Office of the United States Trade Representative, 47 Fed. Reg. 56,428 (1982) (initiation).
119. Id. The United States and Japan consulted first informally and then under GATT
art. XXIII: in April 1985. Section 301 Table, supra note 31.
120. Section 301 Table, supra note 31.
121. Memorandum of March 16, 1986, supra note 7.
122, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Radio Address of the President to
the Nation, 21 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1047 (Sept. 7, 1985).
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reduced or bound Japanese tariffs--on $2.3 billion worth of U.S. exports
to Japan in 1984, worth an estimated $236 million to the U.S. and involving
numerous items. The United States also increased duties on an estimated
$24 million in U.S. imports of leather and certain leather goods from
Japan. Together these measures satisfied the United States for the trade
damage caused to U.S. commerce by the Japanese import restrictions.
In a memorandum to the Trade Representative, the President noted: "The
settlement will increase opportunities for American producers to sell prod-
ucts in Japan. This is far preferable to protectionist measures that would
restrict imports without increasing U.S. exports."' 123
2. EC Canned Fruit
On September 7, 1985, the President also directed the United States
Trade Representative to recommend retaliatory measures unless by
December 1, 1985, the U.S. resolved another long pending dispute, this
time with the EC over its production subsidies for canned fruit. 124 On
October 23, 1981, the California Cling Peach Advisory Board had filed a
petition complaining of the EC's violation of GATT article XVI in granting
production subsidies on EC member states' canned peaches, canned pears,
and raisins. Petitioner claimed that these subsidies resulted in displace-
ment of U.S. exports from the EC market, and impaired tariff bindings
on these products. 125
The Trade Representative initiated an investigation 126 and pursued dis-
pute settlement procedures within the GATT. 127 The U.S. obtained a
favorable panel report and asked the GATT Council to adopt it on several
occasions in 1984, but the Council deferred action at the EC's request. 128
Following the President's September 7 direction to the Trade Repre-
sentative, 129 representatives of the U.S. and EC held a series of consul-
tations. In December they reached an agreement, made formal on De-
cember 13. The two governments noted the EC's reduction in subsidies
123. Memorandum of March 16, 1986, supra note 7.
124. Supra note 38.
125. Office of the United States Trade Representative, 46 Fed. Reg. 61,358 (1981).
126. Id.
127. The U.S. and EC consulted under GATT art. XXIII: 1 on Feb. 25, 1982. On March 31,
1982, the U.S. requested establishment of a dispute settlement panel under GATT art.
XXIII:2. On Aug. 17, 1982, the President directed the Trade Representative to expedite
dispute settlement. 47 Fed. Reg. 36,403 (1982). The GATT panel met on Sept. 29 and Oct. 29,
1982, and submitted its report to the parties on Nov. 21, 1983. The panel met again with
the parties on Feb. 27, 1984, and submitted a revised report to both parties on April 27,
1984. On June 28 the panel met again, and issued its final report on July 20. Section 301
Table, supra note 31.
128. The U.S. requested adoption of the panel report at GATT Council meetings of
April 31, May 29, June 5, and July 16, 1985. Section 301 Table, supra note 31.
129. Supra note 38.
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for canned pears, and the EC agreed to phase out processing subsidies
for canned peaches by July 1987.130
E. RESOLUTION OF INDUSTRY PETITION CASES
On June 14, 1985, the Semiconductor Industry Association filed a pe-
tition alleging that the Government of Japan has protected its home market
and erected major barriers to the sale of foreign semiconductors in Japan.
According to the Association, these Japanese Government practices have
included:
" restrictions on entry into the Japanese semiconductor industry by all
but large and established Japanese electronics producers;
" concentration of semiconductor subsidies and research and devel-
opment aid to the largest electronics producers;
* pressure on semiconductor consumers to "buy Japanese"; and
* formal restrictions on imports and foreign investment.
The Semiconductor Industry Association alleged that the import re-
stricting effect of Japan's market structure is in violation of its GATT
agreements, inconsistent with the semiconductor recommendations and
the commitments made when Japan adopted the 1983 Recommendations
on High Technology, and an unreasonable burden on U.S. commerce. 131
The Trade Representative initiated an investigation on July 11, 1985.132
Throughout the summer and until Thanksgiving, the U.S. and Japan had
a series of consultations in which they reviewed the allegations of unfair
Japanese trade practices. Beginning In November 1985, the two govern-
ments focused instead on the possible basis for a settlement agreement. 133
On July 31, 1986, the President announced that the United States and
Japan had reached a "landmark pact" on semiconductor trade repre-
senting an important step toward freer and more equitable world trade. 134
He said the agreement would enhance the ability of U.S. semiconductor
manufacturers to compete fairly in the Japanese market, and help prevent
Japanese manufacturers from dumping semiconductors in the United States
and third countries. 135
The principal aim of this five-year agreement is to enhance free trade
in semiconductors in the Japanese market. A steady increase in access
130. Section 301 Table, supra note 31.
131. Semiconductor Industry Association, 50 Fed. Reg. 28,866 (USTR 1985) (initiation).
132. Id.
133. Section 306 Report, supra note 50, at 7-8. The U.S. and Japan held technical dis-
cussions in January and February 1986, and consulted intensively from March through July
1986. Id. at 8.
134. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the President, 22
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1021 (July 31, 1986).
135. Id.
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is expected over the agreement's duration. The Japanese Government will
encourage Japanese producers and users of semiconductors to take ad-
vantage of the increased availability of foreign-manufactured products in
their market. Based on monitoring and/or consultation, the Japanese Gov-
ernment will take appropriate actions available under Japanese law and
regulation to prevent exports at less than company-specific fair value.
Under the agreement, the Government of Japan also will establish an
organization to help foreign semiconductor producers increase sales in
the Japanese market. This organization will make quality assessments of
foreign semiconductor products, upon request, and will organize a re-
search fellowship program, seminars, exhibitions, etc., for foreign firms.
The Japanese Government also will promote long-term relationships be-
tween Japanese semiconductor purchasers and foreign manufacturers
through joint product development. Finally, both governments will see to
it that there is full and equitable access for foreign companies to patents
resulting from government-sponsored research and development in this
area. 136
Another aim of the agreement is to help prevent the dumping of semicon-
ductors by Japanese manufacturers at below-cost prices in the U.S. and
other countries. In this regard, the Japanese Government agreed to mon-
itor costs and prices on semiconductor products exported from Japan to
the United States. Products subject to monitoring are either standard,
general use semiconductors, or semiconductors for which there is evi-
dence of a threat of sales at less than fair value. The list of products
subject to monitoring will be reviewed as necessary and products can be
added or deleted from the list as appropriate.
Japanese semiconductor exporters will submit company- and product-
specific cost and export price data to the Japanese Ministry of Interna-
tional Trade and Industry (MITI). When it believes that a monitored
Japanese product is being dumped in U.S. markets at prices less than
company-specific fair value, the U.S. Government will provide the Jap-
anese Government with information to support that belief. The U.S. Gov-
ernment may then request immediate consultations with the Japanese
Government, to last no longer than fourteen days unless both parties
agree to an extension.
The U.S. Government retains full rights to initiate antidumping inves-
tigations based on available information either by self-initiation or in re-
sponse to petition. In the event of self-initiation, the U.S. will seek prior
consultations with Japan.
136. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: U.S.-Japan Semicon-
ductor Trade Agreement 1-2 (July 31, 1986) [hereinafter Fact Sheet].
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If an antidumping action is initiated on any monitored product, the
Japanese Government will see to it that the affected Japanese exporters
provide the Department of Commerce with the data submitted to MITI
within fourteen days after Commerce presents a questionnaire. The Com-
merce Department will then conduct an expedited antidumping investi-
gation. In order to prevent dumping, the Government of Japan also will
monitor costs and export prices on semiconductor products exported by
Japanese firms to third countries. 137 The two governments will meet pe-
riodically to evaluate progress under the agreement and to deal with any
disputes that may arise. Emergency consultations can be requested by
either government at any time. 138
As a result of this agreement, both the antidumping cases 139 and the
section 301 proceeding have been suspended. 140 They will remain sus-
pended as long as the principles and objectives of this agreement are
fulfilled. 141
II!. Conclusion
The Administration recently has acted in an unprecedented fashion
under section 301. This trade remedy has become increasingly useful in
persuading other governments to eliminate or at least reduce unfair trade
barriers. While other barriers remain to be tackled, the aggressive new
section 301 program has enhanced the credibility of the United States in
trade negotiations and thus facilitated more favorable resolutions.
137. Id. at 2-3. Ancillary to the Arrangement on Trade in Semiconductor Products are
agreements between the Department of Commerce and certain Japanese semiconductor
producers suspending Commerce's investigations of certain semiconductor products from
Japan. See Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors of 256 Kilobits and Above
from Japan, 51 Fed. Reg. 28,396 (Dep't Comm. 1986) (suspension); and Erasable Programma-
ble Read Only Memory Semiconductors from Japan, 51 Fed, Reg. 28,253 (Dep't Comm.
1986) (suspension). Under these suspension agreements, Commerce will monitor the costs
and prices of these particular products and advise Japanese firms exporting to the U.S. of
appropriate fair market values for their sales of semiconductors so that they may avoid
dumping at lower prices. Should a Japanese firm engage in future dumping or otherwise
violate a suspension agreement, Commerce may terminate that agreement and immediately
impose dumping duties. Fact Sheet, supra note 136.
138. Fact Sheet, supra note 136.
139. See supra note 137.
140. Memorandum of July 31, 1986, for the United States Trade Representative, Deter-
mination Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 51 Fed. Reg. 27,811 (1986).
141. Fact Sheet, supra note 136.
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